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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16945 
MARC CHESNUT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
. 
------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with theft in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1973), for the obtaining 
or exercising unauthorized control of another's motorcycle 
with a purpose to deprive them thereof. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
on September 19, 1979, in the District Court of Utah County, 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, presiding. The appellant 
was sentenced February 22, 1979, to be confined in the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the judgment of the jury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1979, Marc Chesnut was twenty-two 
and Kenny Covington was twenty. They lived a few houses 
from each other in Lehi, Utah (T.51). Mr. Covington owned 
a motorcycle which he had purchased for $1,650 (T.27). 
On June 27, 1979, at 2:45 a.m. Officer Carl 
Zirrunerman, of the Lehi Police Department, observed 
appellant pushing a motorcycle down the road towards 
his home. The officer pulled along side the appellant and 
asked whose motorcycle it was (T.10). Appellant responded 
that it belonged to Kenny Covington (T.10). When asked 
what he intended to do, appellant said he intended to ride 
it in a nearby vacant lot (T.10). The motorcycle was a 
dirt bike that did not require a key (T.10). 
The officer knew both the appellant and 
Covington. After talking to appellant, Officer Zimmerman 
went to Mr. Covington's house and aroused him from his 
sleep (T.11). Covington told the officer he had not 
given appellant permission to ride his bike that night (T.29). 
During this conversation, appellant pleaded with Covington 
to give him a break (T.21 and 29). 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Officer Zinunerman called Officer Evans to 
assist him. Officer Evans arrested appellant and took 
him to the county jail (T.22). In the presence of 
Officer Evans and Deputy Yance Horne, appellant stated 
that he had taken the bike because Mr. Covington owed 
him $300. Appellant denies making this statement. 
Covington testified that when the theft occurred he 
owed the appellant $100. 
During cross-examination, the defense counsel 
tried to elicit from Covington what his motive was in 
testifying (T.37). Covington had been involved in a 
separate, unrelated, criminal investigation which 
occurred after appellant took his bike(T.44). Officer 
Evans had made this investigation (T.37). Defense 
counsel tried to show that Officer Evans had coached 
Covington on his testimony (T.38). When Covington 
testified that no one told him how to testify, the court 
did not allow defense counsel to pursue this line of 
questioning further (T.42). 
Appellant claims he was pushing the bike to his 
house to get some gas because the bike was empty (T.55). 
Covington testified that there was gas in the bike (T.66). 
The defendant made a motion to dismiss after 
the state's case claiming that the state's evidence was 
-3-
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insufficient to prove the element of intent. The motion 
was denied (T.47). A motion for a directed verdict was 
also denied (T.67). The court, over defendant's objection, 
refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense 
of joyriding (T.70). On September 19, 1979, appellant was 
found guilty as charged. 
states: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PROVED THE CORPUS DELECTI OF 
THE CRIME OF THEFT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
The appellant's only contention is that the 
state failed to show by "clear and convincing evidence," 
independent of the defendant's own confession, that 
the appellant intended to permanently deprive Mr. 
Covington of his motorcycle, and therefore the state 
failed to establish the corpus delecti of the crime of 
theft. Utah case law does not support this contention. 
In State v. Cazier, 521 P.2d 554 (Utah 1974), this 
Court defines corpus delecti as " ... the body of the crime; 
-4-
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and that as it is used in regard to proof of crime, it 
refers only to evidence that a crime has been committed." 
Id. at 555. 1 
The Court also said, referring to prior Utah 
cases which the defendant had cited, that: 
We see nothing in those cases to 
support the idea that the corpus 
delecti includes all the elements of 
a crime. 
Id. at 555. 
In State v. Atin, 203 Kan. 920, 457 P.2d 89 (1969), the 
defendant was convicted of larceny. On Appeal he asserted 
that the state had failed to establish the corpus delecti. 
The Kansas Supreme Court defined the corpus delecti as: 
Id. at 95. 
The corpus delecti of larceny is 
consisted of two elements: (1) that the 
property was lost by the owner; and (2) 
that it was lost by a feloneous taking. 
This Court in State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah 
1977), stated the necessary requirements to establish the 
corpus delecti: 
1 Black's Law Dictionary defines the corpus delecti 
as: "The body of a crime. . In a derivative 
sense, the substance as foundation of a crime; the 
substantial fact that a crime has been committed." 
Black's Law Dictionary 413 (4th ed. 1968). 
-5-
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An admission or a confession, without 
some independent corroborative evidence of 
the corpus delicti, cannot alone support a 
guilty verdict. To sustain a conviction, 
the requirement of independent proof of the 
corpus delicti requires only that the 
State present evidence that the injury 
specified in the crime occurred, and that 
such injury was caused by someone's criminal 
conduct. An admission or confession is 
admissible to connect an accused with the 
crime cormnitted; but the connection of the 
accused with the crime need not be proven to 
establish the corpus delicti. 
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case the State established the 
corpus delicti for theft. Officer Zimmerman's testimony 
showed (1) that the act specified in the crime occurred--
the obtaining or exercising of unauthorized control over 
the motorcycle (T.10); and (2) that someone was 
criminally responsible--that the motorcycle was taken 
by the appellant (T.10). 
This Court in State v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 
P.2d 173 (1954), stated the standard for establishing the 
corpus delecti was "clear and convincing evidence," 
independent of the defendant's testimony. 
The rationale behind the corpus delecti rule is 
to assure that a crime has been committed. In State v. 
Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (1957), this Court 
emphasized that "the rule should be applied with caution 
and not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction 
-6-
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to the administration of justice." 314 P.2d at 356. 
In the instant case, there was clear and convincing 
evidence, independent of the appellant's admission 
that a motorcycle had been stolen, which established 
the corpus delecti. There is no requirement that. the 
state prove the defendant's intent to establish the 
corpus delecti. Such a requirement is contrary to State 
v. Knoefler and State v. Cazier, supra. 
POINT II 
THE STATE ESTABLISHED BY SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT TOOK THE 
MOTORCYCLE WITH THE INTENT TO 
PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE OWNER THEREOF. 
The appellant was convicted of theft, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended, 
in that he "did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over 
the property of Kenny Covington with the purpose to deprive 
the owner thereof. ... " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1953), 
as amended, defines "purpose to deprive" as having the 
"conscious object": 
(a) To withhold property permanently 
or for so extended a period or to use under 
such circumstances that a substantial portion 
of its economic value or of the use and 
benefit thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
-7-
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The appellant argues that the State has failed 
to prove the requisite element of intent. In State v. 
Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196 (1967), this Court 
warned: 
Defendant's case is presented in 
the all-too-common manner of defense 
counsel! arguing from his own theory 
of the evidence that it does not show 
the necessary intent to justify the 
verdict. But this is at variance with 
the correct pattern of procedure on 
appeal and paints quite a different 
picture of this case than we are 
obliged to see. It is our duty to 
respect the prerogative of the jury 
as the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witnesses and as 
the determiners of the facts. Con-
sequently, we assume that they believed 
the state's evidence, and we survey it, 
together with all fair inferences that 
the jury could reasonably draw therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to their 
verdict. 
422 P.2d at 197. 
In State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486 (U~ 
1961), this Court rejected the defendant's contention that 
the prosecution had not proven his intent to burglarize an 
apartment. The Court held: 
It is to be 
being a state of 
of direct proof. 
from conduct and 
in the light of 
remembered that intent, 
mind, is rarely susceptible 
But it can be inferred 
attendant circumstances 
human experience. 
359 P.2d at 487. Accord: State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 
-8-
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218 (Utah 1976) ("The intent to steal or unlawfully deprive 
the rightful owners of their property can be inferred by 
defendant's conduct and the attendant circumstances 
testified to by the witnesses,"); State v. Canfield, supra 
at 198 (". . [W] e are aware of no better nor persuasive 
way to do it (prove what a man intended) than by showing 
both what he did and what he said .... "). 
In the instant case the appellant's purpose in 
taking the motorcycle was shown from his actions and what 
he said. The appellant was apprehended at 2:45 a.m. while 
pushing his neighbor's motorcycle down the street (T.10). 
His neighbor had not given him permission to take the 
bike (T.29), yet he pleaded with the neighbor to give him 
a break (T.21). 
This was a dirt bike, which started without a 
key (T.10). There was gas in the bike (T.66), enough 
that Mr. Chesnut did not need to push the bike 
silently down the road. The area was a residential 
business area (T.14). 
Finally Officer Evans testified that Mr. Chesnut 
told him he took the bike because Mr. Covington owed him 
$300 (T.23). Mr. Covington verified that he did owe the 
appellant money (T.30). It is the respondent's position 
that there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant 
-9-
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had the purpose to permanently deprive the owner of the 
motorcycle. 
In State v. Romero, supra, the defendant appealed 
his conviction for burglary and theft, claiming there was 
insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction. He based 
his claim upon the fact that the witnesses could not identify 
all the co-defendants and gave conflicting testimony about 
the circumstances of the crime. This Court rejected his 
appeal and held: 
This court has long upheld the standard 
that on an appeal from conviction the court 
cannot weigh the evidence nor say what 
quantum is necessary to establish a fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt so long as the 
evidence given is substantial. Further, this 
court has maintained that its function is not 
to determine guilt or innocence, the weight to 
give conflicting evidence, the credibility 
of witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testimony. 
Id. at 218 (citations omitted). This Court continued: 
This court has set the standard for 
determining sufficiency of evidence to require 
that it be so inconclusive or so inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds could not 
reasonably believe defendant committed a crime. 
Unless there is a clear showing of lack of 
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. 
Id. at 219 (citations omitted). Accord: State v. Mills, 
530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975). 
The appellant has not shown that the evidence 
presented at trial was so inherently improbable that this 
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court should decide as a matter of law that the defendant 
did not have the requisite intent. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF THEFT 
OF AN OPERATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE AND THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF JOYRIDING. 
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (1976), 
this Court stated the standard to be used for determining 
when a trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on 
a lesser included offense: 
When an appellant makes an issue of 
refusal to instruct on included offenses, 
we will survey the evidence, and the 
inferences which admit of rational 
deduction, to determine if there exists 
reasonable basis upon which a conviction 
of the lesser offense could rest. 
Id. at 176. Accord: State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 
287 (1972); State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 
(1971). 
-11-
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The standard set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402 (4) (1953), as amended, states there has to be a 
"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting him of the excluded 
offense." 
In State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P.2d 414 
(1964), this Court added: 
Also, it is generally held, under 
ordinary factual situations, that where a 
jury finds the defendant guilty of a 
greater offense, the giving of an erroneous 
instruction on a lesser offense is not 
prejudicial. If the jury were convinced 
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendants were guilty of second degree 
murder, the failure to spell out in detail the 
required intentions for voluntary manslaughter 
could not reasonably influence their decision. 
Id. at 416. In State v. Ash, 23 Utah 2d 14, 456 P. 2d 154 (1969), 
the defendant was convicted of grand larceny of an automobile. 
The evidence disclosed that he had left a motel where he was 
staying, driving another person 1 s car. He was subsequently 
chased down by a deputy sheriff, who discovered shaving 
equipment, underwear, a gun and some gun shells in the car. 
On appeal, the defendant alleged error in that the trial 
court failed to instruct on the lesser offense of driving 
a vehicle without the owner's consent and with intent to 
temporarily deprive the owner of possession. The Court 
rejected this contention, stating: 
_, ")_ 
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. • . the defendant could not have been 
prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider 
whether his intent was to deprive the owner of the 
use of his car temporarily because the court 
clearly told the jury to find the defendant not 
guilty if they failed to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he intended to deprive the owner 
permanently of the use of the car. 
456 P.2d at 155. 
Finally, this Court stated in State v. Bell, 563 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1977), that: 
. . . The trial court should give the 
instructions for lesser included offenses 
whenever, by any reasonable view of the 
evidence, the defendant would be guilty of the 
lesser included offense. The instructions for 
included offenses may be properly refused if 
the prosecution has met its burden of proof 
on the greater offense and there is no 
evidence tending to reduce the greater 
offense. 
563 P.2d at 188. 
The Court added a very significant corrunent at 
563 P.2d 188: 
Whenever this court believes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error in not giving 
the instruction would not have affected the 
verdict the case should not be reversed. . . . 
The respondent agrees that Utah Code Ann. § 
41-1-109 (1953), as amended, is a lesser included offense 
of the theft statutes, Section 76-6-404. However, the 
right to have the jury instructed on the lesser included 
offense is not absolute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) 
states: 
-13-
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The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the 
excluded offense. (Emphasis added.) 
The facts of this case do not justify an instruction 
on the lesser included offense of joyriding. The evidence 
presented by the appellant is inherently suspect and 
uncorroborated. Appellant claims that he had heard 
bikes at night before but offers no evidence to corroborate 
this. His claim that he merely intended to go for a ride 
at 2:45 a.m. in a vacant lot was also uncorroborated (T.10). 
According to Covington-there was enough gas to ride the 
bike for awhile (T.66). Yet, appellant was caught 
pushing the bike not riding it (T.10). Appellant does 
nothing more than dispute the testimony of Officer Evans 
that appellant admitted taking the bike because Mr. Covington 
owed him a debt (T.23). 
The respondent submits that the appellant should 
not benefit merely because he was apprehended quickly. The 
State presented substantial evidence of the defendant's intent. 
The jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant had the purpose to permanently deprive Mr. 
Covington of his motorcycle. Therefore, appellant was 
not prejudiced by a failure to have the jury consider 
whether he intended to temporarily deprive Covington of 
his motorcycle. If there was error in nn~ "~~T~~~ ~~-
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instruction, it was not prejudicial error because it did 
not affect the verdict. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY SUSTAINED THE STATE'S 
OBJECTION TO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF MR. COVINGTON. 
The right of the trial judge to exclude admissible 
evidence is provided for in Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 45 states: 
Except as in these rules otherwise 
provided, the judge may in his discretion 
exclude evidence if he finds that its 
probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the risk that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time, or 
(b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice or of confusing the issues or of 
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had 
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that 
such evidence would be offered. 
The trial court's obligation to control the trial 
and to prevent prejudice and waste of time is weighed 
against the competing right of confrontation. Part of the 
right of confrontation, which is guaranteed in Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, is the right to cross-
examine the witness. The respondent does not take issue with 
the proposition that exposure of a witness' motive in testifying 
is a significant aspect of cross-examination. However, the 
Rules of Evidence do not preclude a court from restricting 
such cross-examination when the concerns expressed in Rule 
45 are present. 
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In State v. Starks, 581 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1978), 
this Court examined a defendant's claim that the trial 
judge unduly limited cross-examination of the witness' 
character. This Court stated: 
The matter of cross-examination and the 
extent thereof rests largely in the discretion 
of the trial judge, and he will be reversed· 
only if he abuses his discretion in a given 
case. Even if an error is made in limiting 
cross-examination, it is not to be reversed 
unless it also is prejudicial. 
Id. at 1017. See also: State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 {Utah 
1974); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977). 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence discusses 
further the effect of erroneous exclusion of evidence: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set 
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears 
of record that the proponent of the evidence 
either made known the substance of the evidence 
in a form and by a method approved by the 
judge, or indicated the substance of the 
expected evidence by questions indicating the 
desired answers, and (b) the court which passes 
upon the effect of the error or errors is of the 
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably 
have had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict or finding. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Maestas, supra, 
addressed the question of what is prejudicial error, and 
made note of State v. Chance, 279 N.C. 643, 185 S.E.2d 227 
-16-
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(1971), where the court found prejudice lacking because 
the mere asking of the question on cross-examination implied 
the contention of counsel who asked the question. 
Also in Maestas the court cited People v. Winston, 
46 Cal.2d 151, 293 P.2d 40 (1956). In Winston, the trial 
judge refused to allow questions of witnesses as to whether 
they had been promised leniency from the police in return 
for their testimonies. This was found to be error but not 
prejudicial error because the jury was aware that the 
witnesses had broken the law and were under the supervision 
of the juvenile authorities. 
In People v. Bliss, 76 Ill.2d 232, 222 N.E.2d 57 (1966), 
the witness for the prosecution had disclosed that a charge 
against her for possession of narcotics had been dropped. 
Defense counsel continued on cross-examination to further 
inquire as to promises by police to dismiss such charges. The 
court sustained objections to further questions on cross-
examination as being repetitious and superfluous. This was 
held not to be improper limiting of cross-examination. 
In the instant case, Mr. Covington admitted he 
was arrested in a criminal investigation (T.44). The defense 
asked him if Officer Evans had taken him to jail in con-
-
nectionwiththis investigation (T.37), and further elicited testimoi 
that Officer Evans had discussed Covington's testying in the 
-17-
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instant case (T.42). Covington stated that no one told 
him how to testify, Evans merely advised him that if he did 
not tell the truth, he woul~ go to jail (T.40,42). 
Through these questions the jury was aware that 
Mr. Covington had been arrested by Officer Evans in 
connection with a separate, criminal investigation. 
The issue whether Mr. Covington may have had a motive 
in testifying was before the jury. Mr. Covington 
testified no one told him how to testify. Further 
inquiries would have been speculative and repetitious. 
The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The corpus delecti of the crime was made out by 
clear and convincing evidence independent of the appellant's 
a&uissions. The evidence showed there was an unlawful 
asportation of the motorcycle and it showed someone was 
criminally responsible. The appellant's intent, in taking the 
motorcycle, can be determined from what he said and did. 
From the circumstances surrounding the theft and from the 
appellant's admission to Officer Evans, the jury could 
conclude the appellant had the intent to permanently deprive 
the owner of the motorcycle. The appellant has not shown 
that the evidence was so inconclusive that reasonable minds 
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could not reasonably believe he had the intent to permanently 
deprive the owner. 
The trial court properly refused to instruct 
the jury on the lesser included offense of joy-
riding. The evidence presented by the appellant to negate 
the theory he intended to permanently deprive the owner 
of the motorcycle was inherently suspect and uncorroborated. 
Even if there was error in not giving the instruction on 
the lesser included offense it would not have affected the 
verdict. 
This verdict should not be set aside by reason 
of the erroneous exclusion of evidence, because the trial 
judge did not abuse his discretion in limiting cross-
examination. The fact that Mr. Covington was being 
investigated by Officer Evans was before the jury. Also, 
Mr. Covington said no one told him how to testify. Further 
questioning would have been repetitious. 
Respondent asserts the rulings of the lower courts 
were proper and prays the jury verdict and court sentence 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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